Lazarus Group
Also tracked as Labyrinth Chollima, HIDDEN COBRA, Guardians of Peace, ZINC, NICKEL ACADEMY, Diamond Sleet
Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.
- Known attack methods
- 93
- Origin
- North Korea
- Motive
- Espionage, Financial gain
- First seen
- 2009
- Last seen
- 2020-08
- Source
- MITRE ATT&CK
How they break in
Techniques MITRE has documented this group using, mapped onto the ATT&CK matrix. Each one is a behaviour you can look for in your own logs, and a control you can test.
Reconnaissance
12 techniques · 2 used
Resource Development
9 techniques · 5 used
Initial Access
11 techniques · 2 used
Execution
20 techniques · 6 used
Persistence
22 techniques · 3 used
Privilege Escalation
13 techniques
Stealth
30 techniques · 13 used
Defense Impairment
18 techniques · 3 used
Credential Access
17 techniques · 2 used
Discovery
34 techniques · 11 used
Lateral Movement
9 techniques · 1 used
Collection
17 techniques · 4 used
Command and Control
18 techniques · 10 used
Exfiltration
9 techniques · 2 used
Impact
15 techniques · 5 used
Reconnaissance2
Resource development8
Initial access4
Execution8
Persistence4
Stealth23
- T1027.007Dynamic API Resolution
- T1027.009Embedded Payloads
- T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded File
- T1036.003Rename Legitimate Utilities
- T1036.004Masquerade Task or Service
- T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1055.001Dynamic-link Library Injection
- T1070Indicator Removal
- T1070.003Clear Command History
- T1070.004File Deletion
- T1070.006Timestomp
- T1078Valid Accounts
- T1134.002Create Process with Token
- T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1202Indirect Command Execution
- T1218System Binary Proxy Execution
- T1218.005Mshta
- T1218.011Rundll32
- T1542.003Bootkit
- T1564.001Hidden Files and Directories
- T1574.001DLL
- T1574.013KernelCallbackTable
- T1620Reflective Code Loading
Discovery11
- T1010Application Window Discovery
- T1012Query Registry
- T1016System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1033System Owner/User Discovery
- T1046Network Service Discovery
- T1049System Network Connections Discovery
- T1057Process Discovery
- T1082System Information Discovery
- T1083File and Directory Discovery
- T1124System Time Discovery
- T1680Local Storage Discovery
Collection6
Command and control11
Exfiltration2
Malware
Families MITRE records this group deploying. Detection names for these are a reasonable place to start.
Tools
Legitimate or dual-use software the group is documented using. Most of it is software your own administrators use too, which is the point.